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One effect of the Statute of Proclamations 1539 was to give Henry VIII the power
to make delegated legislation that could amend primary legislation. Almost 500
years later, on 15May 2012, the word “Brexit” was first used.1Delegated legislation
and Brexit are both surrounded by myths, and they have been brought together
amid a blaze of publicity as the UK prepares to become the first state to leave the
EU. This makes it essential that legal scholars and informed citizens gain a greater
understanding of what delegated legislation is, what its different forms are and the
very wide range of things that they can be used for, how it works, and why it will
be so important in the run-up to, and immediately after, Brexit Day.
Delegated legislation has traditionally been an unsung heroine of the UK’s legal
system: doing most of the work, not receiving any acclaim, and being properly
recognised by only a tiny minority of the population that it serves. Its Cinderella
nature is reflected in the way that it is usually taught: most first-year law
undergraduates learn that delegated legislation comes in various forms: statutory
instruments, Orders in Council, rules, regulations and bylaws (myth 1). They are
told that it is scrutinised by Parliament which ensures its democratic accountability
(myth 2), and that it covers detailed minutiae (myth 3), so it is drafted by experts,
freeing up parliamentary time for more weighty matters. Difficulties may arise if
the House of Lords exerts its scrutinising power in such a way as to defeat the will
of the elected House of Commons (myth 4), but it can be challenged in the High
Court if it is ultra vires, thus guaranteeing the sovereignty of Parliament. And
there, for the most part, the matter rests: it seems likely that most lawyers rarely
think about delegated legislation again.
It is widely acknowledged that the “Leave” campaign’s bus-borne proclamation
that a positive outcome to the Brexit referendumwould release an additional £350
million per week for the NHS was a myth. Most people who voted “Leave”
probably believed the myth, and they probably also thought that Brexit would
result in the UK Parliament’s “taking back control” of the UK’s laws (myth 5).
* Stephanie would like to thank the anonymous reviewer of the first version of this article, and Phillip Johnson,
who kindly read a later draft, for their helpful comments.
In this article, the titles of Statutory Instruments are cited in accordance with Sweet &Maxwell House Style which
omits the initial “The”.
1Oxford Dictionaries, available online: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com [Accessed 19 October 2018].
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This article seeks to bust these myths by explaining the way in which delegated
legislation made using powers delegated by a UK Public and General Act is
classified by those who work with it, and the purposes for which it should be used.
It examines the broad scope andminimal parliamentary scrutiny given to delegated
legislation, then reviews recent literature on some of the tensions arising from
scrutiny. It concludes with a critique of some aspects of the European Union
(Withdrawal) Act 2018, arguing that, as the UK devises procedures to deal with
the legislative consequences of Brexit, it is essential that legal scholars and
journalists—as well as the estimated 8,000 extra civil servants who have been, or
will be, recruited to manage the consequences of Brexit2—have a better
understanding of why and how to make this important source of law.3
Busting myth 1: the classification of delegated legislation
Most law textbooks state that there are several (the number varies) types of
delegated legislation. The statement is usually followed by a list of types of
delegated legislation, in which Orders in Council and statutory instruments (SIs)
feature as two separate entities. This is not the case: Orders in Council are one
form of SI.4
The infelicitous wording of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 s.1(1), whose
marginal note reads: “Definition of ‘Statutory Instrument’”, is probably responsible
for the widespread belief that Orders in Council are a separate form of delegated
legislation from SIs. The full text reads:
“(1) Where by this Act or any Act passed after the commencement of
this Act power to make, confirm or approve orders, rules, regulations
or other subordinate legislation is conferred on His Majesty in
Council or on any Minister of the Crown then, if the power is
expressed—
(a) in the case of a power conferred on His Majesty, to be
exercisable by Order in Council;
(b) in the case of a power conferred on aMinister of the Crown,
to be exercisable by statutory instrument,
any document by which that power is exercised shall be known as
a ‘statutory instrument’ and the provisions of this Act shall apply
thereto accordingly.”
This section can be read as offering two definitions of an SI: a document that
exercises a power conferred on a Minister of the Crown (para.(b)), or a document
that exercises a power conferred on either the monarch or a Minister of the Crown
(closing general text). The former interpretation is more visually prominent because
2 J. Watts, “Brexit: Government employing up to 8,000 extra civil servants to cope with EU departure. The
Independent, 31 October 2017.
3This article was submitted in February 2018, and accepted in March 2018, so it originally referred to the version
of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill that followed the Bill’s second reading in the House of Lords. It was updated
in August and September 2018 to reflect amendments that occurred before the Bill became an Act, but includes some
criticisms that were made while it was going through Parliament, as these are relevant to some of the arguments.
4 S. Pywell, “Untangling the law” (2013) 163(7553) N.L.J. 321. A slightly modified version of this article was
published in the CILEx Journal (“Disentangling the law” (2013) August CILExJ 30), and much of it was reproduced
verbatim in M. Zander, The Law-Making Process, 7th edn (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), pp.105–107.
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of the layout of the section, but it does not withstand scrutiny in the context of
Statutory Instrument Practice, which identifies five principal forms of SI:
• Orders in Council
• Orders of Council
• regulations
• rules
• orders.5
The different purposes for which regulations, rules and orders should be drafted
were set out more than 15 years before the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 came
into effect on 1 January 1948.6
The devolved legislatures in Scotland,Wales and Northern Ireland have separate
powers to enable the making of statutory instruments for their respective
jurisdictions, but these are not considered further in this article, whose focus is SIs
made under the auspices of the UK Parliament.
Orders in Council
The Queen and Privy Council make Orders in Council, which are made when “an
SI made by a Minister would be inappropriate. An example might be an Order
which transfers ministerial functions … or where the Order is in effect a
constitutional document”.7
Orders in Council may be made in two ways. Some are made as primary
legislation under the royal prerogative—the inherent power of the monarch; these
are not considered further in this article. Most are made as secondary legislation
under the legislative powers delegated by statute to the monarch; these are referred
to in this article as “non-prerogative Orders in Council”.
The introductory wording of many recent non-prerogative Orders in Council
stresses the monarch’s constitutional role as head of state:
“Her Majesty, in exercise of the powers conferred upon Her by [specified
sections of specified Acts] is pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy
Council, to order, and it is ordered, as follows: …”.
Non-prerogative Orders in Council are the most difficult form of SI to find.
Those made since 2000 are available via the Privy Council website, but this has
no search facility, and lists only the dates of Privy Council meetings. Researchers
who know the year in which a non-prerogative Order in Council was made have
to search the proceedings for all the meetings in that year—which cover a range
of topics including lists of appointments to the Privy Council, proclamations about
the design of new coins, and orders granting or amending universities’ charters—in
order to locate the identifying characteristic of the parenthesised letters “SI” after
5National Archives, Statutory Instrument Practice: A guide to help you prepare and publish Statutory Instruments
and understand the Parliamentary procedures relating to them, 5th edn (TSO, 2017), para.1.4.1, http://www.legislation
.gov.uk/pdfs/StatutoryInstrumentPractice_5th_Edition.pdf [Accessed 19 October 2018].
6Donoughmore Committee, Report of the Committee on Ministers’ Powers (HMSO, 1932), Cmd.4060. Some of
the material from this report still exits in National Archives, Statutory Instrument Practice: A guide to help you
prepare and publish Statutory Instruments and understand the Parliamentary procedures relating to them.This
description of the use of Orders in Council summarises the effect of the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975 s.1.
7National Archives, Statutory Instrument Practice: A guide to help you prepare and publish Statutory Instruments
and understand the Parliamentary procedures relating to them, para.1.4.9.
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its title. Although they are listed on the legislation.gov.uk website, almost all
non-prerogative Orders in Council have titles that finish with the word “Order”,
rather than “Order in Council”, which makes them impossible to differentiate on
sight from ministerial orders.
Two very different examples illustrate the wide range of legislative effects that
can be achieved, with minimal publicity, by non-prerogative Orders in Council.
The Trading with the Enemy (Revocation) Order in Council 2011 (SI 2011/2991)
revoked two Orders in Council from 1940, and one from 1944. Hyperlinks are
provided to two of the three revoked Orders in Council, but both give error
messages. The titles of two of the revoked Orders in Council suggest that it
was—presumably inadvertently—unlawful for the Channel Islands or the Isle of
Man to conduct trade with Germany or its wartime allies from 1940 until 15
December 2011. It is understandable that the revocation of legislation that had
been redundant for over 55 years was not the subject of a press release, and it is
assumed that those who did business with German organisations in the 66 years
between the end of World War II and the revocation of the Orders in Council will
not be deemed to have traded with the enemy.
The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (External Investigations) Order 2014 (SI
2014/1893) enables the Crown Court to assist other countries’ authorities when
they are investigating the proceeds of crimes committed within their jurisdiction.
If the proceeds are believed to be in the UK, the Crown Court may issue search
and seizure warrants, as well as account-monitoring orders, disclosure orders and
confiscation orders. This SI creates four new criminal offences in England, Wales
and Northern Ireland. The offences are broadly similar to existing offences relating
to the proceeds of crimes committed in those three countries, and involve penalties
ranging from a fine to five years’ imprisonment. These offences were created
without the involvement of either House of Parliament, and with no publicity and,
as noted above, their origin is very hard to trace.
Orders of Council
Orders of Council give statutory effect to rules or regulations made by the
regulatory or governing bodies of professions, principally those involving clinicians,
healthcare workers, paramedics, vets, pharmacists, and complementary therapists
such as chiropractors and osteopaths. Orders of Council are made by “The Lords
of Her Majesty’s Most Honourable Privy Council”; they give the Privy Council
oversight of professional bodies without involving the monarch. Because of their
tightly defined remits, no examples of this type of SI are considered in this article.
Regulations
Since March 2014, regulations have been the recommended means by which
Ministers should exercise their delegated law-making powers.8 Regulations are
used to make substantive laws, and they are the form of SI with which law students
are most familiar: most answers to LLB exam questions about the advantages of
8National Archives, Statutory Instrument Practice: A guide to help you prepare and publish Statutory Instruments
and understand the Parliamentary procedures relating to them, para.1.4.2.
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delegated legislation would include a statement that it is very detailed and technical,
so MPs cannot be expected to have the time or expertise to determine its content.
This is true principally of regulations, whose potential scope is extremely wide.
Topics covered by regulations made between 19 and 30 December 2017 include
individuals’ exposure to ionisation from medical imaging and radiological
treatments,9 four additional categories of prison work to be covered by criminal
legal aid,10 a ban on the manufacture and sale of toiletries containing microbeads,11
and flying restrictions over Hyde Park.12
The purpose and effect of regulations can be opaque to the reader, because they
are often drafted to specify details rather than principles, or to make minor
amendments to pre-existing legislation. The following is the first substantive
provision of the Wireless Telegraphy (Ultra-Wideband Equipment) (Exemption)
(Amendment) Regulations 2018 (SI 2018/44) reg.2(2):
“In regulation 3 of the principal Regulations, in the definition of ‘total radiated
power spectral density’—
(a) for the words ‘contained within harmonised standard EN302
435-1(b)’ substitute ‘contained within harmonised standard
ETSIEN302 065-4(b)’; and
(b) omit footnote (b) and insert the following footnote (b)—
‘(b)ETSI EN 302 065-4 (version 1.1.1) published in July
2017.’”.
It is impossible to work out what this might mean without working back through
other pieces of legislation, and in some cases there will be numerous sets of
amending regulations, rendering it very difficult to work out what the law currently
is.
The Telecommunications Restriction Orders (Custodial Institutions) Regulations
2016 (SI 2016/830) are another case in point. They concern the county court’s
power to make a telecommunications restriction order, identify the people who
may apply for an order, specify the notice and information that must be provided
by applicants, and provide for costs orders, appeals, restrictions on disclosure, and
powers to discharge or vary orders. As it is considered bad practice to restate
primary legislation in SIs—because repetition is futile, and inconsistency would
be problematic—the SI at no point explains what a telecommunications restriction
order is.
A crucial difference between these two sets of regulations is that the latter is
accompanied by an explanatory memorandum (EM), and the former is not. The
EM accompanying SI 2016/830 points out that the Serious Crime Act 2015 s.80
“requires telecommunication providers to prevent or restrict the use of
communication devices by persons detained in custodial institutions”, making it
clear that the aim of the regulations is to specify the procedures for disabling
prisoners’ mobile phones. The interception, in August 2016, of drones carrying
phones, chargers and drugs near HMP Pentonville, and CCTV footage of a similar
9 Ionising Radiation (Medical Exposure) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/1322).
10Criminal Legal Aid (Amendment) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/1319).
11Environmental Protection (Microbeads) (England) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/1312).
12Air Navigation (Restriction of Flying) (Hyde Park) Regulations 2017(SI 2017/1300).
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successful operation at HMPWandsworth in April 2016,13 is proof that—if prisoners
are not to be able to communicate with their nefarious associates while they are
incarcerated—the enforcement of stringent technological controls is desirable.
Regulations are ideal to legislate in this level of detail about an uncontroversial
political aim.
Rules
Rules are procedural in nature: they set out how things should be done, rather than
what should be done. They are relatively rare: in 2015–17, between 2.4 per cent
and 2.8 per cent of SIs included the word “Rules”.14 The Civil Procedure Rules
1998 (SI 1998/3132) substantially reformed the practice of civil justice in England
and Wales, and many sets of rules—including about 80 per cent of those made in
2017—relate to the administration of justice. Other rules are less far-reaching,
governing matters such as firearms,15 insolvency,16 and appeals against the
suspension of churchwardens.17
Orders
Orders are used to exercise executive power, and to take judicial and quasi-judicial
decisions. Orders can be used to effect temporary changes, such as closing roads
while works are carried out, or more lasting measures, such as amending teachers’
pay and conditions. Some forms of order have been created to serve specific
purposes, and three forms of particular interest—remedial orders, legislative reform
orders, and public bodies orders—are discussed below.
Remedial orders (ROs) would be of purely historical interest if, as has been
mooted, the Human Rights Act 1998 were repealed and replaced with a British
Bill of Rights. Section 10 of the Act provides that, if a court declares any legislative
provision to be incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, or
if the European Court of Human Rights rules that a person’s Convention rights
have been infringed, a Minister may make an RO. The Sexual Offences Act 2003
(Remedial Order) 2012 (SI 2012/1883) was made after the Supreme Court’s
declaration, in R. (on the application of F) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department,18 that the requirement for some convicted sex offenders to report
indefinitely to police stations was incompatible with their right to private and
family life under art.8 of the Convention.
Legislative reform orders (LROs) were created by the Legislative and Regulatory
Reform Act 2006, which has been described as being perhaps “the most egregious
example in recent years” of the “Henry VIII” clauses that enable primary legislation
to be amended or repealed by delegated instrument.19 Section 1 of the 2006 Act
permits aMinister to make an LRO to “reduce a legislative burden”, which includes
13BBC News, “Drones seized over HMP Pentonville carrying drugs and phones” (22 August 2016), http://www
.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-37152665 [Accessed 19 October 2018].
14 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk [Accessed 19 October 2018].
15 Firearms (Amendment) Rules 2017 (SI 2017/1281).
16 Insolvency (England and Wales) and Insolvency (Scotland) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Rules 2017 (SI
2017/1115).
17 Suspension Appeals (Churchwardens etc.) Rules 2016 (SI 2016/816).
18R. (on the application of F) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 17; [2011] 1 A.C. 331.
19Zander, The Law-Making Process (2015), p.109.
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“an administrative inconvenience”—a surprisingly low threshold requirement for
a departure from the usual legislative checks and balances that exist in a
parliamentary democracy. Despite widespread concern that these provisions could
usher in a blizzard of untrammelled ministerial law-making, only 36 UK-wide
LROs were made in 2007–2017.20 Legislative reform orders were onerous to
produce, and the Deregulation Act 2015 abolished “legislative burdens” in a wide
range of specified areas, thereby diminishing the need for LROs.
Public bodies orders (PBOs) were created by the Public Bodies Act 2011, which
took 14months of parliamentary debate. They were intended to provide the paraffin
for the highly publicised “bonfire of the quangos” by authorising Ministers to
abolish, merge or modify the 285 public bodies specified in the Act’s five
Schedules. The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee (SLSC)made a detailed
submission about PBOs to the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs
Committee in 2017. It noted that, by the end of 2016, 32 PBOs had affected 53
public bodies, which is just over 10 per cent of the 495 quangos that the
Government had originally identified “for action”.21 The discrepancy does not
mean that all the quangos in question have survived; the bodies that would have
been the subjects of the anticipated-but-never-made PBOs were expected to be
dealt under other forms of legislation, or by voluntary arrangements.22 The SLSC
criticised the Government for inadequately preparing the policy, wasting resources,
and causing distress to many of the public bodies, some of which were subsequently
reinstated.23 The cost savings brought about by PBOs by the end of 2014 were
estimated at £126.5 million; the exact amount is unclear because the savings
forecast under PBOs were presented in three different ways.24 The SLSC tersely
concluded that: “a PBO is not the ‘quick fix’ that paragraph 96 [of the
Government’s 2016 Assessment of the Public Bodies Act 2011] suggests” (original
emphasis).25
Remedial orders provide a simple and straightforward way of ensuring that the
UKmeets its obligations under the Convention, but LROs and PBOs are examples
of political expediency that has gone wrong, causing concern among commentators,
unnecessary fear among those who work in public bodies, and fiscal confusion in
Parliament.
Bustingmyth 2: parliamentary scrutiny of statutory instruments
The range and scope of SIs—which can include the creation of criminal
offences—make it essential that they are subjected to thorough parliamentary
20 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk [Accessed 19 October 2018].
21House of Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Submission to PACAC of 1 February 2017 responding
to the Government Assessment Document on the Post-Legislative Review of the Public Bodies Act 2011 (TSO, 2017),
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/Secondary-Legislation-Scrutiny-Committee/post-legislative
-assessment-of-the-public-bodies-act-2011.pdf [Accessed 19 October 2018]. The committee is ambiguous on this
point. The middle column of the table on p.5 (para.23) identifies 32 orders “plus one later withdrawn”, but the
accompanying text (para.25) states “ultimately only 31 (53%) of the 58 orders originally proposed have been laid”.
22Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Special Report: Public Bodies Act 2011: three years on (TSO, 2014),
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldsecleg/73/7303.htm [Accessed 18 October 2018].
23 Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Submission to PACAC of 1 February 2017 responding to the
Government Assessment Document on the Post-Legislative Review of the Public Bodies Act 2011.
24 Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Special Report: Public Bodies Act 2011: three years on.
25 Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Submission to PACAC of 1 February 2017 responding to the
Government Assessment Document on the Post-Legislative Review of the Public Bodies Act 2011, p.7.
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scrutiny. It is therefore regrettable that such scrutiny is at best minimal, and at
worst non-existent.
The scrutiny of delegated legislation is not shared equally between the two
Houses of Parliament. Two of the three parliamentary committees that routinely
work with secondary legislation—the SLSC26 and the Delegated Powers and
Regulatory Reform Committee (DPRRC)27—are composed entirely of members
of the House of Lords, with members of only the Joint Committee on Statutory
Instruments (JCSI)28 being drawn from both Houses. The workload of the SLSC
is heavy; it scrutinises an annual average of around 1,000 SIs.29 The Regulatory
Reform Committee, which consists solely of MPs, scrutinises draft legislative
reform orders, a role that is carried out in the Lords by the DPRRC.30 The Hansard
Society, a charity that works to promote democracy and strengthen parliaments,
has proposed that the Lords’ established procedures should remain unchanged,
but that the House of Commons should shoulder its share of the burden by creating
a permanent Delegated Legislation Scrutiny Committee (DLSC) that would consist
of up to 15 MPs reflecting the political composition of the Commons. The DLSC
would be chaired by a member of the Opposition, supported by sub-committees
that included MPs with relevant expertise, and assisted by a secretariat and
advisers.31 Unless there is a dramatic change in the attention paid to the charity’s
publications—in 2017, it was reiterating many of the criticisms of the scrutiny
process that it had made in 2014—the DLSC seems destined to remain nothing
more than a thoughtful proposal made by the experts of whom, according toMichael
Gove, the people of Britain have “had enough”.
There are five basic scrutiny procedures that apply to SIs: unlaid; laid; the
negative—or annulment—resolution procedure (of which there are two forms);
the affirmative resolution procedure (of which there are three forms); and more
rigorous procedures, some of which are “super-affirmative” (of which there are
11 forms).32 Every parent Act must specify the procedure that applies to SIs made
using the powers that it delegates. The detail of these procedures is labyrinthine,
but there are some aspects of scrutiny that merit examination because they epitomise
the “rubber-stamping” nature of the processes that most SIs undergo before
becoming law. Irrespective of the procedure used, it is almost always the case that
26The SLSC considers the policy merits of all SIs, and “draws to the attention of the House” any that are politically
or legally important, or that affect public policy (S. Patrick, Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation in Relation to the UK’s
Withdrawal from the European Union (London: The Constitution Society, 2017)).
27The DPRRC examines all Bills passing through the Lords, and reports on inappropriate delegations of legislative
power or levels of scrutiny. (Patrick, Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation in Relation to the UK’s Withdrawal from the
European Union (2017)).
28The JCSI draws the attention of both Houses to an SI if it does not consider that ministerial power is being carried
out intra vires and appropriately, and that SIs are drafted correctly; it does not comment on the merits of policy or
the content of SIs. (Patrick, Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation in Relation to the UK’s Withdrawal from the European
Union (2017)).
29Guidance for Departments Submitting Statutory Instruments to the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee
(TSO, 2015), https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/Secondary-Legislation-Scrutiny-Committee
/SLSC_Guidance_for_Departments_submittingJuly15.pdf [Accessed 19 October 2018].
30UKParliament, “Role RegulatoryReformCommittee”, https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees
-a-z/commons-select/regulatory-reform-committee/role/ [Accessed 19 October 2018].
31R. Fox, J. Blackwell and B. Fowler, Taking Back Control for Brexit and Beyond (London: The Hansard Society,
2017).
32House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution,Delegated Legislation and Parliament: A response to the
Strathclyde Review: 9th Report of Session 2015–16 (TSO, 2016), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516
/ldselect/ldconst/116/11602.htm [Accessed 19 October 2018]. T. Galbraith, Strathclyde Review: Secondary legislation
and the primacy of the House of Commons (TSO, 2015), Cm.9177, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system
/uploads/attachment_data/file/486790/53088_Cm_9177_Web_Accessible.pdf [Accessed 19 October 2018].
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both Houses can only accept or reject an SI in its entirety—there is no scope for
proposing amendments. This has been appropriately described as a “take it or leave
it proposition [that] does nothing to encourage effective scrutiny and Member
engagement with the issues”.33
An SI will normally be unlaid only if it is non-contentious; the most common
occurrences of this are SIs that bring Acts into effect. An unlaid SI that has general
application may be scrutinised by the JCSI, and it will become law on a date
specified within it.34
An SI is laid when the Clerk of the Parliaments receives the House of Lords’
copy of it, and the Votes and Proceedings Office receives the House of Commons’
copy.35 Peers are notified of the laying by the Minutes of Proceedings of the House
of Lords, and MPs are informed by the Votes and Proceedings of the House of
Commons. A laid SI becomes law on the specified date without any parliamentary
proceedings.36
The negative procedure applies to around three-quarters of the SIs that are laid
in any session of Parliament.37 An SI that is subject to this procedure becomes law
without any debate unless either House objects to it within 40 days of its being
laid.38 In 2016–17, only one SI was subject to an annulment motion in the House
of Lords.39 In the Commons, any MP may attempt to trigger a debate by tabling
an early day motion (EDM) to “pray” that the SI be annulled.40 This procedure is
rarely used: in 2016–17, only 21 out of 537 negative SIs were the subject of such
prayers.41 Because the government decides whether an EDM is debated, many
prayers go unheard, and some SIs are debated after the end of the 40-day scrutiny
period specified in the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 s.5(1), which means that
their revocation is not automatic. These procedural constraints effectively give the
government power to decide whether the House of Commons has any opportunity
to debate SIs42; it is perhaps unsurprising that the executive rarely subjects its own
legislation to scrutiny.
Under the affirmative procedure, each House must receive five copies of an SI,
and an EM, so that the Chief Whip and Leader of each House can decide whether
the SI should be the subject of a debate by the whole House, rather than the default
position of its being considered only by the JCSI and the SLSC and DPRRC (in
the Lords) or a delegated legislation committee (DLC)—a committee set up to
33R. Fox and J. Blackwell, The Devil is in the Detail: Parliament and Delegated Legislation (London: The Hansard
Society, 2014), Executive Summary, p.6.
34Galbraith, Strathclyde Review: Secondary legislation and the primacy of the House of Commons.
35Office of Public Sector Information, Statutory Instrument Practice: A manual for those concerned with the
preparation of statutory instruments and the parliamentary procedures relating to them, 4th edn (Office of Public
Sector Information, 2006).
36National Archives, Statutory Instrument Practice: A guide to help you prepare and publish Statutory Instruments
and understand the Parliamentary procedures relating to them, para.2.8.8.
37 Select Committee on the Constitution, Delegated Legislation and Parliament: A response to the Strathclyde
Review: 9th Report of Session 2015–16.
38 Statutory Instruments Act 1946 s.5(1).
39House of Lords, Statistics on Business and Membership: Session 2016–17 (TSO, 2017), https://www.parliament
.uk/documents/publications-records/House-of-Lords-Publications/Records-activities-and-membership/Business
-membership-statistics/HL-Sessional-Statistics-on-Business-and-Membership-2016-17.pdf [Accessed 19 October
2018].
40 Fox, Blackwell and Fowler, Taking Back Control for Brexit and Beyond (2017).
41House of Commons, Sessional Returns: Session 2016–17: Delegated Legislation and Legislative ReformOrders
(TSO, 2017), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/csession/1/108.htm#_idTextAnchor032 [Accessed 19
October 2018].
42 Fox, Blackwell and Fowler, Taking Back Control for Brexit and Beyond (2017).
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debate one or more SIs—in the Commons. Since the Whips and Leaders of both
Houses are appointed by the Prime Minister, this is another opportunity for the
government to limit the effectiveness of the scrutiny process.43 In the House of
Lords, no vote on an SI may be taken until a report has been received from the
JCSI and, in practice, motions to approve SIs are not debated in the House until
the SLSC has also reported. In the Commons, however, some affirmative SIs are
debated before the JCSI has scrutinised them, which means that time and expertise
are wasted, and most SIs are agreed to, on a day following the DLC meeting,
without a division, so most votingMPs are approving something about which they
are likely to know very little.44 In 2016–17, 141 SIs were subject to approval
motions in the House of Lords, and 166 SIs were subject to the affirmative
procedure in the House of Commons.45
Legislative reform orders made under the Legislative and Regulatory Reform
Act 2006 s.18 are covered by a “super-affirmative” procedure that enables the
Regulatory Reform Committee to comment on them, and then their amended form
can be laid before Parliament. Public bodies orders are subject to an “enhanced
affirmative procedure” introduced by the Public Bodies Act 2011 ss.10–11. These
procedures typically require consultation periods and ministerial statements before
an SI is approved by Parliament; they are inevitablymore involved than the negative
and affirmative procedures, and their detail is beyond the scope of this article.
There are inconsistencies in the titles given to certain types of SI. This causes
difficulties for researchers whose starting-point is legislation.gov.uk, where a
search for “Public Bodies Abolition Order” in “UK Statutory Instruments” yields
only 22 of the 32 PBOs that have actually been made. More importantly, it is
problematic for Parliament, leading the SLSC to describe itself as “surprised to
have to make the point” that: “It should be a general rule for all orders following
an enhanced or non-standard procedure that the relevant Act is referenced in the
title to make their distinctive procedure clear” (original emphasis).46
A nugatory amount of parliamentary time and attention is devoted to SIs,
suggesting that the epithet “secondary” is very apt for delegated legislation. In
2016–17, the House of Lords as a whole (excluding its committees) spent 43 hours
51minutes (4.7 per cent of sitting time) onmatters relating to delegated legislation
in 2016–17.47 In the same period, the House of Commons spent 5 hours 29 minutes
(0.5 per cent of its time sitting in the House) on motions for the approval of SIs;
there were no motions to annul or revoke SIs.48 Even the DLCs’ debates are often
rushed: they may last for up to 90 minutes, but the time limit is rarely reached—in
2015–16, the average length of these debates was 26 minutes—and MPs are told
to be non-participative, and to deal with their constituency correspondence, during
meetings.49
43 Fox, Blackwell and Fowler, Taking Back Control for Brexit and Beyond (2017).
44 Fox, Blackwell and Fowler, Taking Back Control for Brexit and Beyond (2017).
45House of Lords, Statistics on Business and Membership: Session 2016–17; House of Commons, Sessional
Returns: Session 2016–17: Delegated Legislation and Legislative Reform Orders.
46 Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Submission to PACAC of 1 February 2017 responding to the
Government Assessment Document on the Post-Legislative Review of the Public Bodies Act 2011, p.3.
47House of Lords, Statistics on Business and Membership: Session 2016–17.
48House of Commons, Sessional Returns: Session 2016–17: Sittings of the House (TSO, 2017), https://publications
.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/csession/1/1.pdf [Accessed 19 October 2018].
49 Fox, Blackwell and Fowler, Taking Back Control for Brexit and Beyond (2017).
Busting Some Myths About Statutory Instruments and Brexit 111
[2019] P.L. January © 2018 Thomson Reuters and Contributors
In July 2016 and July 2017 the SLSC discussed with three senior civil servants
some of the problems, arising from circumstances beyond their own control, that
parliamentary committees face when they are scrutinising delegated legislation.50
Concerns were raised about the quality of drafting, as well as the comprehensibility
of the supporting EMs and impact assessments that committees receive in support
of secondary legislation.51 Unlike primary legislation, SIs are subject to no
centralised political oversight, although every government department now has a
“senior responsible owner” and a Minister to assume overall responsibility for
SIs.52 The SLSC noted its concern that SIs were sometimes laid only three days,
instead of the prescribed 21, before they were required—typically by a deadline
in an EU Directive—to become law, and that the supporting information was
sometimes not available at that point; these difficulties should be ameliorated by
the Parliamentary Business and Legislation Committee’s forthcoming attempts to
try to ensure a smoother flow of SIs with full supporting documentation.53 Efforts
to improve the quality of drafting included giving better, differentiated, training
to the lawyers who draft SIs and the civil servants who draft EMs.54 It was thought
that most of the 100 or so lawyers had already been trained, but it was not possible
to estimate what percentage of civil servants involved in drafting EMs had been
trained, because it was unknown howmany are employed on this work.55 The civil
service is, despite some disconcerting gaps in its knowledge, making real efforts
to improve the quality of SIs and their supporting documents but, since scrutiny
of an SI cannot be delayed until a comprehensive and comprehensible EM is
provided, it cannot hope to resolve the underlying constitutional and procedural
problems identified in this article.
The Hansard Society has proposed, in some detail, amendments to the scrutiny
system. The putative DLSC would bring SIs to the attention of the House for
reasons including legal or political importance, public policy, and imperfect
achievement of its objectives, and some Brexit-related SIs would be subject to a
new, strengthened scrutiny procedure, in whose design the authors have:
“sought to draw on the best aspects of the 11 existing variants, while being
cognisant of the volume, time and capacity constraints that must be taken
into account when considering the Bill [now the EuropeanUnion (Withdrawal)
Act 2018].”56
50Elizabeth Gardiner, First Parliamentary Counsel and Permanent Secretary in the Cabinet Office, Jonathan Jones,
Treasury Solicitor and Permanent Secretary at the Government Legal Service, and ChrisWormald, Head of Government
Policy Profession and Permanent Secretary in the Department of Health. At the 2017 session, the last-named had
become Sir Chris Wormald.
51 Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, The Quality of Information Provided in Support of Secondary
Legislation (TSO, 2016), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/Secondary-Legislation-Scrutiny
-Committee/CORRECTED-TRANSCRIPT-120716-Gardiner-et-al.pdf [Accessed 19 October 2018].
52 Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Oral evidence: Quality of information provided in support of
secondary legislation (TSO, 2017), p.6, http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/Secondary-Legislation
-Scrutiny-Committee/CORRECTED-TRANSCRIPT-SLSC-QI-inquiry-12-09-17-Gardiner-et-al.pdf [Accessed 19
October 2018].
53 Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Oral evidence: Quality of information provided in support of
secondary legislation.
54The “core” training on drafting lasts three days, and some new forms of training, including an introductory
training course (of unspecified length), were introduced in 2017.
55 Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, Oral evidence: Quality of information provided in support of
secondary legislation.
56 Fox, Blackwell and Fowler, Taking Back Control for Brexit and Beyond (2017), p.57.
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These improvements would come at a price: the DLSC’s estimated annual cost
of more than £800,000, including resourcing its sub-committees, would be only
partially offset by the abolition of DLCs—of which there were 150 during
2016–17—and the House of Commons Regulatory Reform Committee.57 Some
people would consider that a price worth paying for greater democratic involvement
in law-making.
There is no credible literature contending that the current system of scrutinising
SIs is clear, comprehensible, appropriate or democratic yet, unless reforms are
implemented, the UK Parliament’s oversight of SIs will remain, in the words of
various commentators: “negligible; entirely theoretical”,58 “palpably
unsatisfactory”,59 and “woefully inadequate”.60 These excoriating criticisms, some
made many years ago, support the Hansard Society’s assertion that “MPs have
now largely withdrawn from trying to hold the government to account for delegated
legislation”.61 Placing untrammelled law-making power in the hands of government
Ministers bypasses the system of checks and balances upon which the doctrine of
separation of powers depends.
Busting myth 3: the scope of statutory instruments
Although it is entirely appropriate that purely technical issues are determined by
experts, and that tedious procedural matters are drawn up by Ministers, some
delegated legislation makes politically significant changes to the law. This is a
long-standing problem: in 1929, 19 years before the first SIs were made, the Lord
Chief Justice of England, Lord Hewart, lamented the wide-ranging law-making
powers that Parliament, perhaps without much detailed consideration, had given
the Minister of Health, under the Rating and Valuation Act 1925 s.67, to “remove
any difficulty” in the application of the Act.62
Much more recently, the Environmental Protection (Microbeads) (England)
Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/1312) were made under the Environmental Protection
Act 1990 s.140, which permits the Secretary of State to make regulations governing
the import, use, supply and storage of anything that he considers polluting or
harmful to humans, animals or plants. The Secretary of State must publish a notice
in the London Gazette specifying the effect of proposed new regulations, the date
on which they will come into force, and where a full draft may be inspected during
a consultation period of at least 14 days. The criminal offences created by these
regulations, which include using microbeads in the manufacture of any rinse-off
personal care product, may not have a maximum penalty that exceeds two years’
imprisonment. This constraint, coupled with the minimalist requirements for prior
display of the regulations, does little to assuage concern that the ability to create
criminal offences has been given to one person, while the 28-year gap between
the Act and the SI exemplifies the concern that “the power to make regulations
57 Fox, Blackwell and Fowler, Taking Back Control for Brexit and Beyond (2017).
58BBC Radio 4, Today, Lord Judge being interviewed by John Humphrys (30 January 2018).
59House of Commons Select Committee on Procedure, First Report: Delegated Legislation (TSO, 2000), para.53,
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmproced/48/4803.htm#a3 [Accessed 19 October 2018].
60 Select Committee on Liaison, Liaison—First Report (TSO, 2000), para.24, https://publications.parliament.uk
/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmliaisn/300/30003.htm#a1 [Accessed 23 February 2018].
61 Fox, Blackwell and Fowler, Taking Back Control for Brexit and Beyond (2017), p.31.
62G. Hewart, The New Despotism (London: Ernest Benn Ltd, 1929).
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goes on for ever”.63 It is axiomatic that the laws of any state should be accessible
to its citizens, and the maxim ignorantia juris non excusat precludes a court from
regarding ignorance of the law as exculpatory. Although secondary legislation is
published on the freely accessible website legislation.gov.uk, it usually arrives
there without any publicity, and its volume is such that only the most dedicated
fans of legal minutiae will read it. This means that almost all defendants who
commit offences created by SIs genuinely would be unable to identify or locate
the criminal laws that they have broken.
Another Act that delegates a startling range of law-making power is the Childcare
Act 2016. Section 1(1) imposes on the Secretary of State a duty to provide 30
hours of free childcare per week, for 38 weeks each year, for qualifying children
whose parents are working. The great majority of the Act, from s.1(4) onwards,
empowers the Secretary of State to make regulations, whose scope extends to
creating criminal offences relating to disclosure about whether a child qualifies
for free childcare (para.2(2)(h)), imposing a maximum penalty of £3,000 for the
criminal offences (para.2(5)(a)), changing the amount of the maximum penalty
(para.2(6)), and “conferring a discretion on any person” (para.4(2)(a)); additionally,
(s)he may “amend, repeal or revoke any provision made by or under an Act
(whenever passed or made)” (para.4(2)(d)). All regulations under this Act are
subject only to the negative or affirmative procedure, despite the fact that some
of them will create criminal offences attracting significant penalties.
The DPRRC noted that the Childcare Bill “is almost entirely enabling”, and
described it as containing “virtually nothing of substance beyond the vague ‘mission
statement’”.64 The committee’s recommendation that the affirmative procedure
should be applied to all the powers delegated by s.1 was partly implemented, but
its scathing criticism that “the purpose of an Act is to change the law, not to ‘send
a message’” appears to have fallen on deaf executive ears.65 The powers delegated
to the Secretary of State under the Childcare Act are so broad that it is almost
impossible to imagine any of the resulting delegated legislation being declared
ultra vires. The vagueness of the drafting eliminates effective judicial control over
the exercise of delegated powers—which, given the lack of scrutiny given to most
SIs by Parliament, means that both theoretical types of check on the executive’s
delegated law-making powers are largely ineffective.
Busting myth 4: House versus House?
The fact that no members of the House of Lords are elected leads to a widely held
view that the upper House has no right to interfere with the government’s legislative
aims. When primary legislation is in issue, the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949
provide that, although the House of Lords may delay the passing of a Bill, it cannot
block it completely. No such democracy-friendly safeguards exist in respect of
secondary legislation, and they had never been thought necessary, because the
63BBC Radio 4, Today, Lord Judge being interviewed by John Humphrys (30 January 2018).
64House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Second Report of Session 2015–16:
Childcare Bill [HL] [(TSO, 2015), paras 1, 8, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/lddelreg/12
/1203.htm#a1 [Accessed 6 December 2017].
65Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Second Report of Session 2015–16: Childcare Bill [HL],
para.10.
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Lords “voluntarily blunts [its] influence by its reluctance to reject SIs”: since 1950,
the House of Lords has rejected only five SIs.66
This laissez-faire attitude changed in 2015, when the Conservative Government
sought to further its “austerity agenda” by raising the financial thresholds at which
people become eligible to receive tax credits. A public outcry—including a petition
signed by over 300,000 people—ensued, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
George Osborne, stated that around 10 per cent of families would be made worse
off by the changes. The Government’s desired changes were included in the draft
of the Tax Credits (Income Thresholds and Determination of Rates) (Amendment)
Regulations 2015, which were approved by the House of Commons by 325 votes
to 290 on 15 September, and debated in the House of Lords on 26 October. The
Lords voted, by 289 votes to 272, to delay its consideration of the SI until the
Government had (i) provided a detailed response to an analysis by the Institute for
Fiscal Studies on the effects of the proposed changes, (ii) explained how it might
mitigate those effects, and (iii) committed to providing transitional protection for
all affected people for a minimum of three years. This vote meant that the SI could
not become law immediately, thereby delaying one of the executive’s fiscal aims.
The Government’s response was to order Lord Strathclyde, a Conservative
hereditary peer and former Leader of the House of Lords, to “conduct a review of
statutory instruments and to consider how more certainty and clarity could be
brought to their passage through Parliament”.67 The resulting 9,387-word review,
which was produced in eight weeks, characterised the central issue as a conflict
between the two Houses of Parliament, and it proposed three ways in which the
House of Lords’ powers could be amended so as to prevent its being able to block
measures that had been approved by the Commons. Its final sentence included the
words “I believe it would be appropriate for the Government to take steps to ensure
that Bills contain an appropriate level of detail and that too much is not left for
implementation by statutory instrument”.68 If this recommendation were followed,
proposals to effect significant policy changes could be debated in detail in both
Houses of Parliament, rather than generally being scrutinised only by committees
whose power is limited to reporting their concerns. This would restore secondary
legislation to its proper role.
During the first four months of 2016, the SLSC, the DPRRC and the Constitution
Committee69 (CC) published responses to the Strathclyde Review. Although no
peer serves on more than one of the committees, all three expressed very similar
views, asserting that the review had focused on the wrong question: the issue was
not the balance of power between the two Houses of Parliament; rather, it was the
one between the executive and Parliament, which “lies at the heart of our
constitution”.70 This imbalance would be less problematic if delegated powers were
used appropriately: “the issue is not the delegation of powers in principle but the
66 Fox, Blackwell and Fowler, Taking Back Control for Brexit and Beyond (2017); Fox and Blackwell, The Devil
is in the Detail: Parliament and Delegated Legislation (2014), Executive Summary, p.7.
67Galbraith, Strathclyde Review: Secondary legislation and the primacy of the House of Commons, p.3.
68Galbraith, Strathclyde Review: Secondary legislation and the primacy of the House of Commons, p.23.
69The Constitution Committee is a committee of the House of Lords. Its remit is to scrutinise all Public Bills for
issues of constitutional importance, and to investigate constitutional issues.
70 Select Committee on the Constitution, Delegated Legislation and Parliament: A response to the Strathclyde
Review: 9th Report of Session 2015–16: Summary (TSO, 2016), final paragraph, https://publications.parliament.uk
/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldconst/116/11603.htm [Accessed 19 October 2018].
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scope and nature of the delegations sought by governments”,71 and it is inappropriate
that
“delegated powers in primary legislation have increasingly been drafted in
broad and poorly-defined language that has permitted successive governments
to use delegated legislation to address issues of policy and principle, rather
than points of an administrative or technical nature”.72
The Hansard Society has pointed out that:
“The time and resource dedicated to the Strathclyde Review … stands in
marked contrast to the reluctance of successive governments to tackle real
problems of democratic accountability in the House of Commons.”73
In November 2016, the Government announced that it did not plan to legislate
to curtail the Lords’ power to block SIs, but warned that the decision might be
reconsidered if the House did not exercise “discipline and self-regulation”.74 Lord
Strathclyde stated that the government was “appealing to the very best instincts
of the House of Lords”, which included recognising the limits of its power, and
using that power “only in the most exceptional of circumstances”.75 The unexpected
outcome of the Brexit referendum, and consequent change of government, had
resulted in a re-setting of political priorities, and Lord Strathclyde pointed out that
the options outlined in his report remained available if the House of Lords decided
to use its veto. Despite the House of Commons’ “defeat” on tax credit thresholds,
it has been pointed out that, if an SI is rejected by either House, the government
can lay an almost identical SI very rapidly, so it is inaccurate to refer to the House
of Lords as having “a power of veto” over SIs; a more accurate term is “a power
to reject”.76
In an echo of Lord Hewart’s 1929 concerns, Lord Rowlands commented in 2016
that, 50 years previously, he had witnessed “a raging debate about what should be
in primary and what should be in secondary legislation”; he noted that the same
debate had been re-ignited by the Strathclyde review, and asked whether some
real progress could be made. The three senior servants from whom the SLSC was
taking evidence responded that “it is within Parliament’s gift to decide on the
balance between primary and secondary legislation”, although parliamentary
counsel and lawyers provide informal advice toMinisters about where the balance
might be.77
Lord Rowlands’ remarkswere fully justified: even the self-defined “modernising”
New Labour Governments of 1997–2010—which brought about major
71House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory ReformCommittee, Special Report: Response to the Strathclyde
Review: 25th report of 2016–17 (TSO, 2016), p.10, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/lddelreg
/119/119.pdf [Accessed 22 February 2018].
72Select Committee on the Constitution, 2016. Delegated Legislation and Parliament: A response to the Strathclyde
Review: 9th Report of Session 2015–16, p.7.
73 Fox, Blackwell and Fowler, Taking Back Control for Brexit and Beyond (2017), p.8.
74BBC News, “Plans to curb House of Lords powers dropped” (17 November 2016), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news
/uk-politics-38008315 [Accessed 18 October 2018].
75BBC Radio 4, The World at One, Lord Strathclyde being interviewed.
76Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee,Response to the Strathclyde Review: Effective parliamentary scrutiny
of secondary legislation (TSO, 2016), para.30, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldsecleg/128
/128.pdf [Accessed 19 October 2018].
77 Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, The Quality of Information Provided in Support of Secondary
Legislation, pp.17–20.
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constitutional reforms, including redefining the office of the Lord Chancellor,
significantly changing the composition of the House of Lords, curtailing the royal
prerogative, and effecting devolution in the UK—did nothing to grasp the nettle
of burgeoning executive power. Indeed, Tony Blair used one SI—made entirely
outside parliamentary procedures—to permit himself to appoint up to three publicly
funded political appointees to the Prime Minister’s Office for the duration of the
Parliament without invoking the normal civil service recruitment procedure,78
before appointing Alistair Campbell and Jonathan Power to the influential posts
of Downing Street Press Officer and Chief of Staff respectively. The three
subsequent governments, although of political persuasions opposed to that of Blair
and Gordon Brown, have shown similar inertia—perhaps it is inevitable that, since
most of the matters discussed by Parliament are initiated by the government, any
executive will be reluctant to curtail its own powers by passing legislation to restrict
the scope of SIs.
Busting myth 5: control of the UK’s post-Brexit law
The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 s.20(2) provides that the UK will
leave the EU at 23:00 GMT on “exit day”, 29 March 2019. At that point, the EU
Treaties will cease to have effect, and the parent Act for secondary legislation
implementing EU law—the European Communities Act 1972—will be repealed
(2018 Act s.1).79 Four of the five forms of SI—Orders in Council, orders, rules
and regulations—are expressly within the scope of the 1972 Act s.2(2), and any
of them may be used to give domestic effect to EU law, subject to conditions
specified in Sch.2 of that Act.
European Union Regulations and other measures that were directly applicable
in UK law under the 1972 Act s.2(1) will be retained under the 2018 Act s.3.
European Union laws that originated in Directives whose deadlines for
implementation have passed should already have been incorporated into UK law
via Acts of Parliament or secondary legislation. Acts will not need any action, as
they will remain in force unless they are individually repealed or amended. The
2018 Act s.2 provides that SIs made under the 1972 Act will continue to have
effect, giving the later Act the status of an adoptive parent.
These immediate effects of the Act are fairly uncontroversial; they ensure that
UK law will remain stable, preventing such undesirable consequences of Brexit
as the sudden lawfulness of including unlimited quantities of volatile organic
compounds in paint.80Ofmuch greater potential concern is the fact that all Ministers
may, for a period of up to two years after exit day, make such regulations as they
consider appropriate to mitigate deficiencies in retained EU law arising from
withdrawal (s.8). They may also make regulations to implement the withdrawal
78Civil Service (Amendment) Order in Council 1997; Civil Service Commissioners, Annual Report 1997–1998
(Civil Service Commissioners, 1998), http://civilservicecommission.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012
/03/Annual%20Report%2097-98.pdf [Accessed 19 October 2018].
79 If Brexit is subject to a transitional agreement, it is likely that the 1972 Act will remain in effect until the end of
that period—see M. Elliott and S. Tierney, “Political Pragmatism and Constitutional Principle: The European Union
(Withdrawal) Act 2018” [2019] P.L. 37.
80The Volatile Organic Compounds in Paints, Varnishes and Vehicle Refinishing Products Regulations 2012 (SI
2012/1715) consolidate three previous sets of regulations, and implement Annex III of Directive 2004/42 on the
limitation of emissions of volatile organic compounds due to the use of organic solvents in certain paints and varnishes
and vehicle refinishing products and amending Directive 1999/13/EC [2004] OJ L143/87.
Busting Some Myths About Statutory Instruments and Brexit 117
[2019] P.L. January © 2018 Thomson Reuters and Contributors
agreement by making “any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament”
between the passing of an Act approving the final terms of Brexit and exit day
(s.9), and to effect “any such provision as the Minister considers appropriate in
consequence of this Act” for up to 10 years after exit day (s.23). The DPRRC
considered that the test for making these SIs should have been “whether remedial
action is objectively necessary rather than whether the Minister thinks it is
appropriate”—the former was specified in para.3.7 of theWhite Paper that preceded
the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill—and that SIs made under these clauses
should have been subject to the affirmative procedure and fully explained in the
supporting EMs.81 This test echoes the CC’s recommendation that the Act should
have distinguished between necessary amendments to the law, and discretionary
amendments to implement policy changes.82
The 2018 Act s.8(5) and (6) provide that the powers to remedy deficiencies
includemaking regulations that do anything that could be done by an Act, including
enabling public authorities, “whether or not established for the purpose” to make
legislation. This provision—which, before the Act was passed, was regarded as
“notable for its width, novelty and uncertainty”—has been described as enabling
tertiary legislation, which would not be subject to any parliamentary scrutiny unless
it were an SI made under regulations.83 The examples of possible “deficiencies”
given in s.8(2) are not exhaustive, and the Hansard Society has expressed concern
that “it may be whatever a minister wishes it to mean”.84 The extensive powers in
ss.8 and 9 are subject to constraints: theymay not result in new or increased taxation
or fees, apply retrospectively, create a criminal offence for which an adult could
receive a punishment of more than two years’ imprisonment, establish a public
authority, or affect any provisions related to the Human Rights Act 1998 (ss.8(7)
and 9(3)). Additionally, regulations made under s.8 may not be made to implement
the withdrawal agreement, or amend or repeal the Scotland Act 1998, the
Government of Wales Act 2006 or the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (s.8(7)). The
DPRRC expressed concern, prior to the 2018 Act’s receiving the Royal Assent,
that what became s.9(2) contains the classic “Henry VIII power”, but its
recommendation that this provision should be removed in its entirety was not
implemented.85None of this does anything to negate Lord Judge’s observation that
the UK has become “habituated to giving Ministers power”, leading to a risk that
the nation will “go to sleep on the dangers of giving the executive too much
power”.86
Brexit could necessitate additional Orders of Council if the professional bodies
chose to amend rules or regulations that had been introduced solely to implement
81Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, 3rd Report of Session 2017–19 (TSO, 2017), HL Paper
22, Summary, para.1, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/lddelreg/22/2202.htm [Accessed 19
October 2018].
82House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, The “Great Repeal Bill” and delegated powers: 9th
Report of Session 2016–17 (TSO, 2017), para.37, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst
/123/123.pdf [Accessed 19 October 2018].
83Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, 3rd Report of Session 2017–19, paras 15 and 28.
84 Fox, Blackwell and Fowler, Taking Back Control for Brexit and Beyond (2017), p. 16.
85Delegated Powers and Regulatory ReformCommittee,European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: 12th Report of Session
2017–19 (TSO, 2018), HL Paper 73, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/lddelreg/73/7302.htm
[Accessed 5 February 2018].
86BBC Radio 4, Today, Lord Judge being interviewed by John Humphrys (30 January 2018).
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the provisions of Directives that were not considered necessary or desirable in the
UK.
Orders in Council could be used to clarify the powers of the UK courts and
tribunals in respect of matters over which the Court of Justice of the European
Union will no longer have jurisdiction. It is impossible to predict whether or how
the creation of ministerial orders may be affected by the much-heralded “taking
back of control” that will occur at the moment of severance. Before the European
Union (Withdrawal) Bill was published, the CC expressed its concern:
“The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ is thus likely to involve a massive transfer of
legislative competence from Parliament to government. This raises
constitutional concerns of a fundamental nature, concerning as it does the
appropriate balance of power between the legislature and executive.”87
If Brexit does lead to a plethora of orders, the legislature’s “control” over the
UK’s laws—a key plank of the “Leave” campaign—will have increased only
negligibly, with significant law-making power passing from the much-maligned
“unelected Brussels bureaucrats” to Ministers and their officials. As Lord Judge
noted:
“This Bill [now the 2018 Act] is designed to produce the sovereignty of
Parliament… but you don’t exchange the powers given to the EU by reposing
them in the hands of Ministers—it’s Parliament that’s sovereign, not the
executive.”88
Regulations and rules seem bound to proliferate, as measures previously imposed
by EU Regulations must continue to apply unless a positive decision is taken to
amend or revoke them. In May 2018, Steve Baker, then Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, told the House of
Commons Procedure Committee that the number of SIs that would need to be
made under 2018 Act was expected to be very much closer to 800 than 1,000”,
but that “things can change”, and Andrea Leadsom, the Leader of the House, added
a number of additional SIs “in the low hundreds” would be required by other
Brexit-related legislation.89
Despite their potentially far-reaching nature, regulations made under the Act
will not automatically be subject to super-affirmative procedures. The 2018 Act
Sch.7 paras 1 and 10 provide that most SIs made under s.8 or s.9 must be laid
before, and approved by resolution of, both Houses of Parliament if they: transfer
an EU entity’s law-making power to a UK public authority; relate to a fee for a
function carried out by a UK public authority; create, or widen the scope of, a
criminal offence; or create or amend a power to legislate. This requirement is
waived for regulations under s.8 if a Minister considers that the regulations need
to be made so urgently that there is not time to follow the affirmative procedure
(Sch.7 para.5(2)). Statutory instruments made under those sections that do not
87House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, The “Great Repeal Bill’“and delegated powers: 9th
Report of Session 2016–17, para.47.
88BBC Radio 4, Today, Lord Judge being interviewed by John Humphrys (30 January 2018).
89House of Commons Procedure Committee, Oral evidence: Exiting the European Union: scrutiny of delegated
legislation (TSO, 2018), HC 386, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument
/procedure-committee/exiting-the-european-union-scrutiny-of-delegated-legislation/oral/82332.html [Accessed 19
October 2018].
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fulfil these criteria will be subject merely to the annulment procedure that has been
so little used in the past. Provision has, however, been made for negative SIs to
be “sifted” by a newCommons select committee, the European Statutory Instrument
Committee. A similar process will be carried out by the Secondary Legislation
Scrutiny Committee in the House of Lords, and the sifting committees will have
10 sitting days from the date of the laying of a negative SI to make
recommendations on the procedure to which it should be subjected—though the
responsibleMinister need not accept the recommendation.90 Steve Baker estimated
that 20–30 per cent of the SIs made under 2018 Act—roughly 32 per week for six
months—would be subject to an affirmative procedure.91 These proposals fall a
significant way short of meeting the recommendations of the CC, the Hansard
Society, the Institute for Government, and the DPRRC, which suggested that a
parliamentary committee should sift all Brexit-related SIs in order to decide which,
if any, scrutiny procedure should apply to them.92
The sources on which this article has drawn most heavily—papers by
parliamentary committees and the Hansard Society—are the product of many hours
of work by people with extensive and detailed knowledge of delegated legislation
and parliamentary procedure. Their subject is complex, but their message is coherent
and consistent—and compelling if the nation is to avert the risk identified by Lord
Judge of “go[ing] to sleep on the dangers of giving the executive toomuch power”.93
Many of their recommendations have nonetheless gone unheeded by the
Government: the heavily criticised Bill has become an Act, albeit with some
concessions, and Ministers now have extensive law-making powers that they can
exercise according to their own political preferences.
Conclusion
As the UK faces its uncertain future, it is essential that academics, journalists and
informed citizens understand what the forms of secondary legislation are and what
each should be used for, as well as the difficulties and tensions arising from the
way that it is made, and the reforms that are so urgently needed. This understanding
will enable informed analysis and criticism of the executive’s use—and potential
abuse—of SIs as it revels in its unaccustomed freedom from the shackles of EU
law. If the myths persist, however, and nothing significant changes, the outlook
is grim: the UK’s post-Brexit legislation will include numerous measures
reminiscent of a long-dead uxoricidal monarch whose girth suggested that, like
David Davis, he really could have his cake and eat it.94
90R. Kelly, The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018: scrutiny of secondary legislation (Schedule 7) (TSO,
2018), https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-8329#fullreport [Accessed 19October
2018].
91 Procedure Committee, Oral evidence: Exiting the European Union: scrutiny of delegated legislation.
92 Select Committee on the Constitution, The “Great Repeal Bill” and delegated powers: 9th Report of Session
2016–17; Patrick, Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation in Relation to the UK’s Withdrawal from the European Union
(2017); Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, 3rd Report of Session 2017–19; Delegated Powers
and Regulatory Reform Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: 12th Report of Session 2017–19.
93BBC Radio 4, Today, Lord Judge being interviewed by John Humphrys. (30 January 2018).
94This, according to Michel Barnier and Donald Tusk, is myth 6.
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